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Abstract
This article is the rst to examine electric power producers investment decisions when com-
petition is imperfect and the transmission grid congested. This analysis yields numerous original
insights. First, congestion on the grid is transient, and may disappear when demand is highest.
Second, transmission capacity increases have complex impacts on generation: they may increase,
decrease, or have no impact on the marginal value of generation, and may have similar or opposite
impacts on the marginal value of di¤erent technologies. Third, the true social value of transmission,
including its impact on investment, may be signicantly lower than is commonly assumed.
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1 Introduction
The electricity industry has been restructured for about twenty years in many countries. Former
regional or national monopolies have been dismantled. Electricity production and supply (retail) have
been opened to competition. One essential objective of the restructuring was to push to the market
decisions and risks associated with investment in electric power production (Joskow (2008)). It was
expected that e¢ ciency gains from competitive pressure would more than compensate for the loss of
coordination in planning electricity generation and transmission infrastructure.
Twenty years later, the perspective is rather di¤erent: policy makers in Europe and the United
States are concerned that generation and transmission investments are poorly coordinated. To examine
this issue, this article develops a model of investment in generation assets, that incorporates imperfect
competition among producers and constraints on the transmission grid. As discussed below, these are
essential features of the investment decision.
In most countries, only a handful of companies compete to develop and operate electric power
plants. While their number varies by country, less than ten in most European markets, more in most
North American markets, no observer argues that the industry is perfectly competitive. An analysis
of investment in power generation must therefore incorporate imperfect competition.
Constraints on the transmission grid split power markets into sub-markets. This is not surpris-
ing: historically, incumbents developed the transmission grid to move power within their service area.
Interconnections were built primarily to provide reliability, not to facilitate trade. Maybe more sur-
prising has been the di¢ culty faced by would-be developers of new transmission lines. Two reasons
explain this quasi-impossibility: rst, Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) opposition by local communities
and general environmental constraints and limitations. Second, economic di¢ culty in apportioning
the costs and benets of transmission expansion among all stakeholders (Hogan (2013)).
Investors therefore incorporate their competitorsstrategies and constraints on the transmission
grid as they analyze possible generation investment: most energy companies develop and run power
ow models that predict prices in di¤erent markets, taking into account transmission constraints and
conrmed and planned generation and transmission expansion.
As will be discussed in Section 2, previous articles have examined the impact of transmission con-
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straints in imperfectly competitive spot markets, while another branch of the literature has examined
investment decisions in a single market. This article is the rst to examine investment decisions under
imperfect competition in the presence of transmission constraints. Using a simple network topology,
presented later in this introduction, this analysis yields four main insights of relevance for policy
making, which were not available using the previous analyses.
First, congestion is dynamic and potentially transient. Consider the simple case of two markets,
linked by an interconnection. Demand varies across states of the world. Marginal cost in market
i = 1; 2 is ci. Without loss of generality, assume c1 < c2. Suppose that the line becomes congested
from market 1 to market 2: producers in market 1 would like to export their cheaper power into
market 2, but are limited by the interconnection capacity. Previous spot-market analyses, that ignored
investment in generation, concluded that the line remains congested. However, the analysis presented
in this article proves this intuition wrong: to cover capital cost, the price in market 1 must rise above c1
for some states of the world, and reaches c2, at which point the interconnection is no longer congested:
congestion on the interconnection is thus transient.
Second, transmission constraints modify generation investment in a non-trivial way. Transmission
and generation can be complements or substitutes, i.e., an increase in transmission capacity may
increase, decrease, or have no impact on the marginal value of generation capacity. It may have
similar or opposite impacts on the marginal value of baseload (low marginal cost) and peaking (high
marginal cost) technologies.
These rst two observations highlight the complex interaction between transmission and genera-
tion. To fully understand the impact of policies they propose, policy makers cannot simply rely on
general economic principles. They must develop detailed models of the industry, that include the
transmission network.
Third, the social value of transmission is not solely the di¤erence in marginal costs, as is commonly
assumed, but also includes the impact of transmission on investment in generation and on competitive
intensity. This observation is crucial to evaluate the benets of new transmission projects. The
resulting value may be lower than the simple di¤erence in marginal costs. On a simple example, the
article shows that the standard approach, that uses only marginal cost, overstates the social value of
the interconnection capacity by almost 330%.
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Finally, the impact of an increase in interconnection capacity on producers prots is unclear.
Thus suggests producers may not be best positioned to advocate or nance grid re-inforcement. This
conclusion had been reached from the analysis of short-term competitive interactions (e.g., Léautier
(2001)). It is now conrmed when long-term investment incentives are taken into account. This
strengthens the policy objective of vertical separation between producers and transmission grid owners.
This article uses the simplest network topology: two markets, linked by one interconnection.
Demand varies across states of the world. One technology is available in each market. The baseload
technology, located in market 1, has lower marginal cost and higher investment cost than the peaking
technology, located in market 2. This simple setup is more realistic than it seems. Real power
networks consists of course of multiple interconnected zones, but to a rst approximation, many
can be represented by two zones: for example in Britain, north (gas red production) and south
(high London demand); upstate and downstate New York (separated by the Central East constraint);
northern and southern California; and in Germany, north (o¤ shore wind mills) and south (industrial
Bavaria). Furthermore, constraints exist precisely because production costs di¤er, thus assuming a
single technology by region is an adequate rst step.
This article also assumes congestion on the grid is managed via Financial Transmission Rights
(FTRs, a precise denition is provided later). Since FTRs are used in most US markets and are
progressively implemented in Europe, this assumption provides a reasonable description of reality.
Finally, I consider N symmetric generation rms, present in both markets, hence having access to
both generation technologies. This assumption is not always met in practice, since rms are rarely
exactly symmetric. However, it is consistent with the long-term equilibrium, which is the focus on
this article: with free entry, rms enter each market as long as it remains protable, and develop, in
each market, the available generation technology.
With these assumptions, the transmission-constrained Cournot equilibrium can be easily compared
to the transmission-constrained social optimum, and to the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium.
This articles scientic contribution is threefold: rst, it characterizes the imperfectly competitive
investment in the presence of transmission constraints (Proposition 1). If the interconnection is "large"
(but not so that large that is never congested), it is congested from the baseload market 1 to the
peaking market 2 for some states of the world. The aggregate cumulative capacity in equilibrium is
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not a¤ected by the congestion, while the equilibrium baseload capacity is the uncongested baseload
capacity, weighted by the size of its domestic market, plus the interconnection capacity.
If the interconnection is "thin", it is rst congested from market 1 to market 2, then for higher-
demand states of the world, from market 2 to market 1. The equilibrium peaking capacity is the
cumulated uncongested capacity, weighted by the size of its domestic market, plus the capacity of the
interconnection. The equilibrium baseload capacity is the solution of a simple rst-order condition.
The impact of an interconnection capacity increase on installed generation capacity in each market
is shown to have counterintuitive. properties. In particular, the impact is reversed as the line moves
from "thin" to "large".
These e¤ects are derived analytically and illustrated using a stylized representation of the French
and British markets.
Second, this article determines the marginal social value of interconnection capacity (Proposition
2): an increase in interconnection capacity reduces the short-term cost of congestion, but also modies
the equilibrium generation investment and the competitive intensity. While the net welfare impact is
always positive, it may be much lower than is generally assumed.
Third, this article shows that an increase in interconnection capacity has an ambiguous impact
on producers prots (Proposition 3): it increases the FTR payment, but it also modies generation
investment. The net e¤ect may be positive or negative.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 relates this article to the academic literature.
Section 3 presents the setup and the equilibrium investment without transmission constraints, that
closely follows Zöttl (2011). Section 4 derives the equilibrium investment when the interconnection is
congested. Section 5 derives the marginal social value of interconnection capacity. Section 6 derives the
marginal value of interconnection capacity for the producers. Finally, Section 7 presents concluding
remarks and avenues for further research. Technical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Review of the academic literature
This article brings together three distinct streams of literature. First, electrical engineering and
operations research scientists, for example Schweppe et al. (1988), have determined the optimal
5
vertically integrated investment plan from an engineering/economics perspective.
A second series of articles has examined imperfect competition in the spot market when transmis-
sion constraints are present (for example, Borenstein and Stoft (2001), Cardell et al. (1997), Léautier
(2001), Willems (2002), and more recently the empirical analysis by Wolak (2013)). This articles
setup is almost identical to Borenstein and Stoft (2001): two markets linked an interconnection, and
two production technologies. The main di¤erence is that producers here are present in both markets,
and own FTRs. As will be shown later, this considerably simplies the analysis of the spot market
equilibrium.
Finally, other articles have examined the investment decision for a single market. This literature
started with the peak-load pricing analysis of Boiteux (1949), and Crew and Kleindorfer (1976), that
examine the economic optimum. Borenstein and Holland (2005) determine the perfectly competitive
outcome. Joskow and Tirole (2006) examine the perfect and imperfect competition cases. Zöttl (2011)
develops a model of Cournot competition and investment in a single market. This article extends Zöttl
(2011) analysis to include multiple markets, separated by a congested interconnection.
Ruderer and Zöttl (2012) is the closest to this work, that examines the impact of transmission
pricing rules on investment, under perfect competition. This work thus extends Ruderer and Zöttl
(2012) by incorporating imperfect competition.
3 Uncongested investment
3.1 Assumptions and denitions
Demand All customers are homogenous. Individual demand is D (p; t), where p is the electricity
price, and t  0 is the state of the world, distributed according to cumulative distribution F (:), and
probability distribution f (:) = F
0
(:).
Assumption 1 8t  0;8q  Q, the inverse demand P (Q; t) satises1
1.
Pq (Q; t) < 0 and Pq (Q; t) <  qPqq (Q; t) :
1Using the usual notation: for any function g (x; y), gx = @g@x , gy =
@g
@y
, and gxx, gxy, and gyy are the second derivatives.
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2.
Pt (Q; t) > 0 and Pt (Q; t) > q jPqt (Q; t)j :
Pq < 0 requires inverse demand to be downward sloping. Pq (Q; t) <  qPqq (Q; t) implies that the
marginal revenue is decreasing with output
@2
@q2
(qP (Q; t)) = 2Pq (Q; t) + qPqq (Q; t) < 0;
and guarantees existence and unicity of a Cournot equilibrium.
Pt > 0 orders the states of the world, Pt (Q; t) > q jPqt (Q; t)j implies that the marginal revenue is
increasing with the state of the world
@2
@t@q
(qP (Q; t)) = Pt (Q; t) + qPqt (Q; t) > 0;
and that the Cournot output and prot (dened later) are increasing.
Assumption 1 is met for example if demand is linear with constant slope P (Q; t) = a (t)   bQ,
with b > 0 and a0 (t) > 0.
Customers are located in two markets, indexed by i = 1; 2. Total mass of customers is normalized
to 1, a fraction i 2 (0; 1) of customers is located in market i. Demands in both markets are thus
perfectly correlated.
Supply Two production technologies are available, indexed by i = 1; 2, and characterized by variable
cost ci and capital cost ri, expressed in e=MWh. Technology 1 is the baseload technology: c1 <
c2 and r1 > r2. For example, technology 1 is nuclear generation, while technology 2 is gas-red
generation. Investing and using both technologies is assumed to be economically e¢ cient. Precise
su¢ cient conditions are provided later in this Section.
Technology 1 (resp. 2) can be installed in market 1 (resp. 2) only. This is not unrealistic: the mix
of technologies chosen to produce electricity depends on the resource endowment of a market. For
example, market 1 could be France, which uses nuclear generation, and market 2 could be Britain,
which uses gas-red generation, or market 1 could be the western portion of the PJM market (coal),
7
and market 2 could be the eastern sea shore of PJM (gas).
Each producer has access to both technologies. N symmetric producers compete à la Cournot in
both markets.
Firms prots In state t, rm n produces qni (t) using technology i. Its cumulative production is
qn (t). Aggregate production using technology i is Qi (t), which is also the aggregate production in
market i. Q (t) is the aggregate cumulative production. If both markets are perfectly connected, rm
n operating prot in state t is
n (t) = qn (t)P (Q (t) ; t)  c1qn1 (t)  c2qn2 (t) = qn (t) (P (Q (t) ; t)  c2) + qn1 (t) (c2   c1) :
For i = 1; 2; rm n capacity invested in technology i is kni , aggregate capacity invested technology
i is Ki =
PN
n=1 k
n
i , also the aggregate capacity in market i. Producer n cumulative capacity is k
n,
and aggregate cumulative capacity is K =
PN
n=1 k
n.
Critical states of the world and value functions The equilibrium output of a symmetric N -rm
Cournot equilibrium with cost c is QC (c; t), uniquely dened by
P
 
QC (c; t) ; t

+
QC (c; t)
N
Pq
 
QC (c; t) ; t

= c:
Consider a producer with marginal cost c > 0 and capacity z > 0, while aggregate capacity is
Z > 0. The rst state of the world for which the marginal revenue of this producer is equal to c is
t^ (z; Z; c), uniquely dened by
P
 
Z; t^ (z; Z; c)

+ zPq
 
Z; t^ (z; Z; c)

= c:
As will be proven below, the marginal value of capacity is 	(z; Z; c), dened by
	(z; Z; c) =
Z +1
t^(z;Z;c)
(P (Z; t) + zPq (Z; t)  c) f (t) dt:
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3.2 Equilibrium investment absent congestion
Producers play a two-stage game. In the rst-stage, they decide on their baseload and peaking
capacities. In the second stage, they compete à la Cournot in each state of the world, constrained by
their installed capacities.
Lemma 1 (Zöttl (2011)) The unique symmetric equilibrium
 
KU1 ;K
U

of the investment-then-production
game is characterized by
	
 
KU ; c2

=
Z +1
t^(KU ;c2)

P
 
KU ; t

+
KU
N
Pq
 
KU ; t
  c2 f (t) dt = r2 (1)
and
	
 
KU1 ; c1
 	  KU1 ; c2 = Z t^(KU1 ;c2)
t^(KU1 ;c1)

P
 
KU1 ; t

+
KU1
N
Pq
 
KU1 ; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(KU1 ;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
= r1   r2: (2)
Proof. The reader is referred to Zöttl (2011) for the proof. Intuition for the result can be obtained
by assuming rms play a symmetric equilibrium, and deriving the necessary rst-order conditions.
Suppose rms play a symmetric strategy: for all n = 1; :::; N , kn1 =
K1
N and k
n = KN . Firms rst play
a N -rm Cournot game with cost c1. For t  t^ (K1; c1), all rms produce at their baseload capacity.
Price is thus determined by the intersection of the (vertical) supply and the inverse demand curves.
For t  t^ (K1; c2), all rms start using peaking technology, and play a N -rm Cournot game with cost
c2. Finally, for t  t^ (K; c2), all rms produce at their cumulative capacity, and the price is again set
by the intersection of the (vertical) supply and the inverse demand curves. This yields expected prot
for rm n
U (kn; kn1 ) =
Z t^(K1;c1)
0
QC (c1; t)
N
 
P
 
QC (c1; t) ; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z t^(K1;c2)
t^(K1;c1)
kn1 (P (K1; t)  c1) f (t) dt
+
Z t^(K;c2)
t^(K1;c2)

QC (c2; t)
N
 
P
 
QC (c2; t) ; t
  c2+ kn1 (c2   c1) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(K;c2)
(kn (P (K; t)  c2) + kn1 (c2   c1)) f (t) dt  (r1   r2) kn1   r2kn;
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which can be rewritten as
U (kn; kn1 ) = B (k
n
1 ;K1; c1; c2)  (r1   r2) kn1 +A (kn;K; c2)  r2kn; (3)
where
A (z; Z; c) =
Z +1
t^(z;Z;c)

z (P (Z; t)  c) 

QC (c; t)
N
 
P
 
QC (c; t) ; t
  c f (t) dt;
and
B (z; Z; c1; c2) = A (z; Z; c1) A (z; Z; c2) +
Z +1
0
QC (c1; t)
N
 
P
 
QC (c1; t) ; t
  c1 f (t) dt:
U (kn; kn1 ) is separable in (k
n; kn1 ). This is a fundamental economic property of the problem: the
determination of the cumulative and the baseload capacities are independent.
Observe that 	(z; Z; c) is the derivative of A (z; Z; c) at a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., if z = ZN :
@A
@z
(z; Z; c) +
@A
@Z
(z; Z; c)

z= Z
N
= 	

Z
N
;Z; c

:
To simplify the notation, I use t^ (Y; c)  t^   YN ; Y; c, 	(Y; c)  	   YN ; Y; c, A (Y; c)  A   YN ; Y; c, and
B (Y; c1; c2)  B
 
Y
N ; Y; c1; c2

to characterize symmetric equilibria. Then, maximizing equation (3)
with respect to kn (resp. kn1 ), then setting k
n = KN (resp. k
n
1 =
K1
N ) yields the rst-order condition (1)
(resp. (2)). The structure of the equilibrium is illustrated on Figure 1. By considering upward and
downward deviations, Zöttl (2011) proves that

KU
N ;
KU1
N

is indeed the unique symmetric equilibrium,
if c2 and c1 are su¢ ciently di¤erent.
Cumulative capacity has value only when it is constrained, hence only states of the world t 
t^
 
KU ; c2

appear in equation (1). As usual with Cournot games, a marginal capacity increase gen-
erates incremental margin (P (K; t)  c2) and reduces margin on all inframarginal units. Equilibrium
capacity balances this expected gain against the marginal investment cost r2.
Similarly, only states of the world t  t^  KU1 ; c1 appear in equation (2). A marginal substitution
of baseload for peaking capacity increases the marginal revenue when baseload capacity is constrained
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but not yet marginal, and reduces the cost of production by (c2   c1) in all of states where the peaking
technology is marginal. Equilibrium capacity exactly balances this gain against the marginal cost of
the substitution (r1   r2). An alternative interpretation is that a marginal substitution of one unit of
baseload for peaking capacity substitutes (	 (K1; c1)  r1) for (	 (K1; c2)  r2). At the equilibrium,
both values are equal.
Equations (1) and (2) are closely related to the expressions dening the welfare maximizing ca-
pacity. Dene t^0 (Z; c) and 	0 (Z; c) by
P
 
Z; t^0 (Z; c)

= c and 	0 (Z; c) =
Z +1
t^0(Z;c)
(P (Z; t)  c) f (t) dt:
The peak load pricing literature (for example, Léautier (2013)), proves that the optimal cumulative
capacity K and baseload capacity K1 are respectively dened by
	0 (K
; c2) = r2 and 	0 (K1 ; c1) 	0 (K1 ; c2) = r1   r2:
The equilibrium capacities are simply obtained by replacing inverse demand by marginal revenue in
the rst-order conditions. This result arises because producers invest in both technologies, thus fully
internalize the value of the substitution between baseload and peaking technologies, which coincides
with the social optimum.
I have sofar assumed existence and unicity of
 
KU1 ;K
U

. A set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions
is:
Assumption 2 Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for existence of
 
KU1 ;K
U

1. In every state of the world, the rst unit produced is worth more than its marginal cost: P (0; t) >
c2 8t  0; on average, the rst unit produced is worth more than its long-term marginal cost:
E [P (0; t)] > c2 + r2.
2. Technology 2 exhibits higher long-term marginal cost than technology 1: c2 + r2 > c1 + r1.
3. Equilibrium cumulative capacity is higher using technology 2 than using technology 1:
 (c2; r2) >  (c1; r1) ;
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where  (c; r) is the unique solution to 	( (c; r) ; c) = r.
4. c2 and c1 are su¢ ciently di¤erent.
The rst part of Assumption 2 guarantees existence of KU > 0 solution of rst-order condition (1),
its second part guarantees existence of KU1 > 0 solution of rst-order condition (2), and its third part
guarantees that KU > KU1 . Zöttl (2011) proves that the last part guarantees that there is no incentive
for an upward deviation from KU1 , hence that K
U
1 is indeed an equilibrium. As will be shown below,
the latter condition is not required when the interconnection is congested, thus I do not explicit it
further.
4 Equilibrium investment when the interconnection is congested
We now introduce the possibility that the interconnection may be congested.
Congestion, Financial transmission Rights, and rms prots ' (t) is the ow on the inter-
connection from market 1 to market 2 in state t. The power owing on the interconnection is limited
by the technical characteristics of the line and reliability operating standards. The maximum ow
on the interconnection from market 1 to market 2 (resp. from market 2 to market 1) is + (resp.
 ). Since reliability the constraints imposed by operating standards are not symmetrical, maximum
admissible ows are not in general symmetrical i.e., + 6=  . The transmission constraints are thus
    ' (t)  +:
Congestion on the interconnection is managed using Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs, Hogan
(1992)). Each rm owns (or has rights to) 1N th of the available FTRs. I assume producers do not
include the acquisition cost of FTRs in their analysis. For example, they are granted FTRs, as
was the case in the Mid Atlantic market in the United States. Further work will examine how the
equilibrium is modied when this assumption is relaxed.
If the line is not congested, each rm receives the single market price for its entire production,
and no congestion revenue, as was the case in Section 3. Uncongested ows, prices, and quantities are
illustrated on Figure 2.
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If the interconnection is congested, pi (t), the price in market 1 reects local supply and demand
conditions. For example, if the interconnection is congested from market 1 to market 2,
8><>: 1D (p1 (t) ; t) = Q1 (t)  
+
2D (p2 (t) ; t) = Q2 (t) + 
+
,
8><>: p1 (t) = P

Q1(t) +
1
; t

p2 (t) = P

Q2(t)++
2
; t
 :
This is illustrated on Figure 3.
Each rm receives the local market price for its production in each market, plus the FTR payment:
(p2 (t)  p1 (t)) +N if the interconnection is congested from market 1 to market 2, (p1 (t)  p2 (t)) 
 
N
if the interconnection is congested from market 2 to market 1.
If the interconnection is congested from market 1 to market 2, rms n operating prot in state t
is thus
n = qn1 (p1   c1) + qn2 (p2   c2) +
+
N
(p2   p1)
= qn1

P

Q1   +
1
; t

  c1

+ qn2

P

Q2 +
+
2
; t

  c2

+
+
N

P

Q2 +
+
2
; t

  P

Q1   +
1
; t

= 1
qn1   
+
N
1

P

Q1 (t)  +
1
; t

  c1

+ 2
qn2 +
+
N
2

P

Q2 +
+
2
; t

  c2

+
+
N
(c2   c1) :
Dene the adjusted outputs n1 =
qn1 
+
N
1
, n2 =
qn2+
+
N
2
, X+ = 
+
2
and  i =
PN
n=1 
n
i for i = 1; 2.
Then,
n = 1
n
1 (P ( 1; t)  c1) + 2n2 (P ( 2; t)  c2) + 2
X+
N
(c2   c1) : (4)
Adjusted output ni is rm n decision variable in market i, that incorporates market size, the impact
of imports (exports), and the FTR payment. When the interconnection is congested, dynamics in
each market are independent, thus rms optimize separately in each market. Equation (4) shows that
the prot function is the sum of two "standard" Cournot prot functions, were adjusted output ni
replaces output qni . The equilibrium of the congested spot market game is therefore easily obtained.
The simplicity of the solution to the spot market game is due to the inclusion of the FTR payment
in the prot function and the symmetry of generators. These assumptions are the main di¤erence
with Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (2000). Since most electricity markets use FTRs, the rst feature
is realistic, while the second corresponds to the long-term equilibrium with free entry in each market.
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Adjusted baseload capacity for producer n is dened by xn1 =
kn1 +
1
, and the aggregate adjusted
baseload capacity by X1 = K1 
+
1
.
Similarly, if the interconnection is constrained from market 2 to market 1, producer n adjusted
baseload (resp. peaking) capacity is yn1 =
kn1+
 
N
1
(resp. yn2 =
kn2 
 
N
2
), and the aggregate adjusted
baseload (resp. peaking) capacity is Y1 = K1+
 
1
(resp. Y2 = K2 
 
2
).
Congestion regimes Analysis presented in Section 3 shows that the maximum ow from market 1
to market 2 occurs when baseload technology produces at capacity, and peaking technology is not yet
turned on, and is equal to ' (t) = 2K1. The maximum ow from market 2 to market 1 occurs when
both technologies produce at capacity, and is equal to ' (t) = K1   1K. Thus, di¤erent situations
must be analyzed, represented in the (+; ) plane on Figure 4.
Suppose rst 1KU2  2KU1 . Then, the interconnection is never congested if +  2KU1 , and
congested from market 1 to market 2 if + < 2KU1 and    < K1   1K. Analysis presented in
Proposition 1 shows that this latter condition is equivalent to (+ + )  1KU2 . If (+ + ) <
1K
U
2 the interconnection is successively congested in both directions.
If 1KU2 > 2K
U
1 , there also exist a region of the plan (
+; ) for which the interconnection is
congested from market 2 to market 1.
To simplify the exposition, I assume 1KU2  2KU1 , which leads to all relevant cases: intercon-
nection not congested, congested in one direction only, and congested successively in both directions.
Equilibrium investment The equilibrium is summarized in the following:
Proposition 1 Equilibrium generation mix
 
KC1 ;K
C

:
1. If +  2KU1 , the transmission line is never congested, KC = KU and KC1 = KU1 .
2. If + < 2KU1 and (
+ + )  1KU2 , the transmission line is congested from market 1 to
market 2 for some states of the world. The cumulative installed capacity KC is the cumulative
uncongested capacity:
KC = KU ; (5)
and the baseload capacity is the uncongested baseload capacity scaled down by its domestic market
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size 1KU1 , plus the interconnection capacity 
+:
XC1 = K
U
1 , KC1 = 1KU1 ++: (6)
3. If (+ + ) < 1KU2 , the transmission line is congested from market 1 to market 2 for some
states of the world, then from market 2 to market 1 for higher-demand states of the world. The
peaking capacity is the total capacity scaled down by its domestic market size 2KU , plus the
interconnection capacity  :
Y C2 = K
U , KC2 = 2KU + ; (7)
while baseload capacity is determined implicitly as the unique solution of
	
 
XC1 ; c1
 	  XC1 ; c2+	  Y C1 ; c2 = r1: (8)
Proof. The rst point is evident. In the remainder of this proof, suppose + < 2KU1 . We rst need
to prove that the line is indeed congested, i.e., that + < 2KC1 . The proof proceeds by contradiction. If
+ > 2K
C
1 , the line would never be congested, hence K
C
1 = K
U
1 , and 
+ > 2K
U
1 , which contradicts
the hypothesis.
Then, to obtain intuition for the equilibrium prots, suppose rms play a symmetric strategy: for
all n = 1; :::; N , kn1 =
K1
N and k
n = KN . As long as the interconnection is not congested, rms use
the baseload technology, and play a symmetric N -rm Cournot game with cost c1. Power ows from
market 1, where production is located, to market 2.
For t  t^ (X+; c1), the transmission constraint is binding, before technology 1 is at capacity. Power
ow from market 1 to market 2 is equal to the interconnection capacity +. Both markets are inde-
pendent. Consider rst market 1. Applying equation (4) to market 1, rms play a symmetric Cournot
game with cost c1, which sets the price in market 1. For t  t^ (X1; c1), technology 1 reaches capacity,
and price in market 1 is determined by the intersection of the vertical supply curve at (K1   +)
and the demand curves 1D (p; t). Consider now market 2. First, price in market 2 is determined
by the intersection of the vertical supply curve at + and the demand curves 2D (p; t). Then, for
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t  t^ (X+; c2), both technologies produce. Applying equation (4) to market 2, rms play a symmetric
Cournot game with cost c2, which sets the price in market 2.
For t  t^ (X1; c2), prices in both markets are equal. The interconnection is no longer constrained,
and we are back to the unconstrained case. Algebraic manipulations presented in Appendix A prove
that expected prot can be expressed as
n = 1 (B (x
n
1 ; X1; c1; c2)  (r1   r2)xn1 )+(A (kn;K; c2)  r2kn)+2

B
 
X+; c1; c2
  (r1   r2) 1
N
X+

:
(9)
Prots are again separable in (xn1 ; k
n). If a symmetric equilibrium exists, it satises equations (5)
and (6). This is illustrated on Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c. By considering deviations from the equilibrium
candidate, Appendix A shows that

XC1
N ;
KC
N

for all n = 1; :::; N is indeed an equilibrium.
The above analysis has assumed that the line is never congested from market 2 to market 1. This
is true if and only if
' (t) = KC1   1KC     ,
 
1K
U
1 +
+
  1KU     , + +   1  KU  KU1  = 1KU2
as announced. Suppose now (+ + ) < 1KU2 . Nothing changes until t = t^ (X1; c2). For t 
t^ (X1; c2), prices in both markets are equal, the interconnection is no longer constrained, rms play a
symmetric Cournot game with cost c2.
For t  t^ (Y1; c2), the interconnection from market 2 to market 1 is congested before cumulative
capacity is reached. Markets are again separated. Price in market 1 is determined by the intersection
of the vertical supply curve at (K1 + ) and the demand curves 1D (p; t).
In market 2, taking their FTR revenue into account, producers play a symmetric Cournot game
with cost c2. Finally, for t  t^ (Y2; c2), technology 2 produces at capacity. Price in market 2 is deter-
mined by the intersection of the vertical supply curve at (K2    ) and the demand curves 2D (p; t).
This is illustrated on Figure 6a, and 6b.
Appendix B proves that a rm expected prot is
n = 1 (B (x
n
1 ; X1; c1; c2) +A (y
n
1 ; Y1; c2)) r1kn1+2 (A (yn2 ; Y2; c2)  r2yn2 )+2B
 
X+; c1; c2
 r2 
N
:
(10)
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Then,
@n
@kn2

kn2=
K2
N
=
@A
@xn2
(xn2 ; X2; c2) +
@A
@X2
(xn2 ; X2; c2)

xn2=
X2
N
  r2
= 	(X2; c2)  r2;
and
@n
@kn1

kn1=
K1
N
=
@B
@xn1
(xn1 ; X1; c1; c2) +
@B
@X1
(xn1 ; X1; c1; c2) +
@A
@yn1
(yn1 ; Y1; c2) +
@A
@Y1
(yn1 ; Y1; c2)

yn1=
Y1
N
  r1
= 	(X1; c1) 	(X1; c2) + 	 (Y1; c2)  r1:
If a symmetric equilibrium exists, it satises conditions (7) and (8). By considering upward and
downward deviations, Appendix B proves that

KC1
N ;
KC2
N

dened by equations (7) and (8) is in fact
the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1 calls for a few observations. Suppose rst interconnection is congested in one direc-
tion only, + < 2KU1 and (
+ + )  1KU2 . Congestion stops on peak. This appears counterin-
tuitive. One would argue that, since peaking technology (located in market 2) has higher marginal
cost than the baseload technology (located in market 1), once the interconnection becomes congested,
it always remains so. This intuition turns out to be invalid, as it ignores the necessary recovery of
investment cost: when the baseload technology produces at capacity, price in market 1 increases, and
eventually reaches the marginal cost of the peaking technology.
As a consequence of the previous observation, congestion has no impact on the oligopolistschoice
of total installed capacity. This may again appear surprising. The intuition is that total capacity is
determined by its marginal value when total capacity is constrained. In these states of the world, the
interconnection is no longer congested, and the peaking technology is price-setting. Thus congestion
no longer matters.
For this reason, this result is robust to changes in the ownership structure of generation assets, the
allocation of FTRs, or the method for congestion management (as long as no transmission charge is
levied when the interconnection is not congested).
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Let us now turn to the baseload technology. By assumption, baseload generation reaches capacity
after the interconnection is congested (otherwise, there would never be congestion). Equation (9)
shows that the economics of the adjusted baseload capacity X1 are identical to those of the baseload
capacity K1 when the interconnection is not congested.
Congestion on the transmission line reduces the baseload capacity installed at market 1, and
increases the peaking capacity installed at market 2. Equation (6) simple relationship between KC1
and KU1 results from the symmetry of asset ownership and the FTR allocation. However, the general
insight should be robust to other specications.
Consider now the heavily congested line, (+ + ) < 1KU2 . In equilibrium, congestion from
market 2 to market 1 depends not only on  , the interconnection capacity in that direction, but on
the sum of interconnection capacities. This result may appear surprising. The intuition is that, as +
increases, so does the installed baseload capacity, hence the ow from market 1 to market 2. Thus,
both + and   contribute to reducing congestion from market 2 to market 1.
The peaking technology reaches capacity after the line is congested (similar to the baseload tech-
nology in the previous case). Thus, as equation (10) illustrates, the economics of the adjusted peaking
capacity Y2 are identical to those of the total capacity K when the interconnection is not congested.
An increase in   raises KC2 one for one. This result is robust to a change of ownership, as long as
the N generators located in market 2 are entitled to the FTR payments from market 2 to market 1.
Baseload technology reaches capacity after the interconnection is congested in one direction, but
before it gets congested in the other direction. Marginal value is thus (	 (X1; c1) 	(X1; c2)) when
the interconnection is congested into market 2, plus 	(Y1; c2) when the interconnection is congested
into market 1. At the equilibrium, the total marginal value is equal to the marginal cost r1, as
described by equation (8).
Formally, baseload capacity KC1 and peaking capacity K
C
2 are functions of interconnection capac-
ities (+; ). A few properties of KCi (
+; ) for i = 1; 2 are summarized below:
Corollary 1 Suppose (+ + )  2KU2 , then
KCi (0; 0) = i (ci; ri) ; i = 1; 2;
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and
0 <
@KC1
@+
< 1 and
@KC1
@ 
=
@KC1
@+
  1 < 0:
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B.
When both markets are isolated, only technology i is available to serve demand in market i, hence
equilibrium capacity is Ki (0; 0) = i (ci; ri).
An increase in +, the interconnection capacity from market 1 to market 2, leads to a less than
one for one increase in the capacity installed in market 1: an increase in K1 reduces 	(Y1; c2), the
marginal value of K1 once the interconnection is congested into market 1, hence, ceteris paribus, leads
to lower K1. Similarly, an increase in  , the interconnection capacity from market 2 to market 1
reduces the capacity installed in market 1 (and increases the capacity installed in market 2 one for
one).
This analysis highlights the counter-intuitive impact interconnection expansion has on installed
generation capacity. If both markets are isolated, imperfectly competitive producers install the autarky
capacity i (ci; ri) in each market. If capacity is increased, for example by + =   =  such
that + +   = 2 < 2KU2 , producers install K2 =  additional capacity in market 2. They
install less capacity in market 1 if and only if
K1 =
@KC1
@+
+ +
@KC1
@ 
  =

2
@KC1
@+
  1

 < 0, @K
C
1
@+
<
1
2
:
This condition may or may not be met, depending on the value of the parameters. Thus, increasing
the interconnection capacity has an ambiguous impact on installed capacity in market 1. This is
slightly surprising as one would have expected that additional export capability would have led to
higher baseload capacity.
Increased interconnection capacity also increases cumulative capacity, since
K1 + K2 = 2
@KC1
@+
 > 0:
Again, this is slightly surprising, as one would have expected that additional exchanges possibility lead
to greater trade, hence to lower installed capacity. Furthermore, if @K
C
1
@+
> 12 , the cumulative capacity
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increase is more than 1 for 1.
If 2  2KU2 , the impact is almost opposite: aggregate capacity remains constant, and baseload
capacity substitutes for peaking capacity.
Even in the simplest setting, the impact of increasing interconnection capacity on installed gen-
eration is sometimes surprising, and has opposite impacts depending on the level of congestion. In a
real power grid, characterized by multiple technologies and multiple nodes, the complexity is much
higher.
This suggests that policy makers should be extremely careful when assessing the impact of trans-
mission capacity increase on installed generation.
Finally, as in the unconstrained case, the equilibrium capacities are obtained by replacing inverse
demand by marginal revenue in the rst-order conditions (see for example Léautier (2013)). This
remarkable properties is due to the symmetry of generators and the use of FTRs.
Numerical illustration The analysis can be illustrated on a stylized description of France (market
1) and Britain (market 2). Demand is assumed to be identical in Britain and France, up to the market
size. Maximum demand is 90 GW in France, and 60 GW in Britain2. Thus, 1 = 3=5 and 2 = 2=5.
The interconnection capacity is + =   = 2 GW .
Technology 1 is nuclear generation, while technology 2 is Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT ).
Using data from International Energy Agency (IEA (2010)), reported in Hansen and Percebois (2010,
page 324), CO2 emissions rate from the US Environmental Protection Agency, and a carbon price of
30 e/ton, the variable and investment costs, expressed in e=MWh are:
1 2
cn 10:3 55:5
rn 41:0 10:5
Considering only one generation technology in each country is of course a rst approximation: nu-
clear generation produces around 80% of the electricity consumed in France, while CCGT contributed
2Data for year 2010 from the Transmission System Owners and Operators, Réseau de transport délectricité (Rte) in
France, and National Grid in Britain.
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46% of the electricity produced in Britain3 in 2010. More problematic is the assumption of symmetric
generators. While at least three rms have signicant presence in both markets (EDF , E:ON , and
GdF   Suez), the symmetry assumption is clearly not met today. Thus, the analysis is illustrative,
that reects the long term equilibrium, assuming free entry in each market. I run two scenarii: N = 3,
and N = 6.
Demand and uncertainty are specied as follows (Léautier (2014)): (i) inverse demand is linear
with constant slope: P (Q; t) = a (t)  bQ where a (t) = a0   a1e 2t, (ii) and states of the world are
distributed according to f (t) = 1e 1t. This specication provides an adequate representation of
actual demand (shape of load duration curve, and elasticity), while leading to simple expressions, as
illustrated below.
The parameters to be estimated are a0; a1,  = 12 , and b. Maximum Likelihood on the load
duration curve for France in 2010 is used to estimate . The same load duration curve provides an
expression of a0 and a1 as a function of bQ1 where Q1 = a0 p0b is the maximum demand for price p0.
As previously mentioned, Q1 = 150 GW . The average demand elasticity  is then used to estimate b.
Of course, estimates of the short-run elasticity of demand are very uncertain. I use  =  0:1 at price
p0 = 100 e=MWh, which corresponds to the upper bound of estimates reported by Lijesen (2007).
Following this procedure, Léautier (2014) estimates
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
bQ1 = 1 873 e=MWh
a0 = 1 973 e=MWh
a1 = 1 236 e=MWh
 = 1:78
:
It is easier to express all capacity as fractions of Q1. The functional form selected leads a simple
form for 	(K; c). Integrating by parts yields
	(K; c) =
a1
(1 + )
 
a0   c  N+1N bQ1 KQ1
a1
!1+
:
Suppose rst N = 3. Solving numerically equations (1) and (2) yields KU = 63:7%  Q1 and
3Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/historical-electricity-data-1920-to-2011?? ??
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KU1 = 38:3%Q1, thus KU2 = 25:4%Q1.
Then, 1KU2 = 15:26%  Q1 < 15:30%  Q1 = 2KU1 , which is the situation described in this
article. The sum of interconnection capacities in both directions is + +   = 4 GW = 1:33% 
Q1. Thus, ++  < 1KU2 : the model predicts the interconnection is successively congested in both
directions. This is veried empirically, as illustrated on Figure 7. Britain imported from France 73%
of the time in 2010, and the interconnection was congested from France into Britain 8% of the time.
However, Britain also exported into France, suggesting that the price in France rose higher than the
price in Britain. The exports were so high 4% of the time that the interconnection was congested from
Britain into France.
We then solve numerically equation (8). The functions KC1 and K
C are presented on Figure 8 for
+
Q1 =
 
Q1 2 [0; 20%]. For + 
1KU2
2 = 7:6%  Q1, KC1 decreases from KC1 (0) = 34:4%  Q1 to
KC1

1KU2
2

= 30:6%Q1, while KC increases from KC (0) = 59:9%Q1 to KC

1KU2
2

= KU =
63:7%Q1.
The impact of an increase in interconnection capacity on generation capacity is completely reversed
depending on the congestion level: if the line is highly congested

+  1KU22

, increasing its capacity
yields lower baseload and higher peaking capacities in equilibrium, while it yields higher baseload and
lower peaking capacities if the line is lightly congested

1KU2
2  +  2KU1

.
The structure of the solution is identical for N = 6. As expected, the unconstrained capacities are
higher: KU (N = 6) = 72:8%Q1, KU1 (N = 6) = 43:7%Q1, and KU2 (N = 6) = 29:1%Q1. For
+  1KU22 = 8:7%Q1, KC1 decreases from KC1 (0) = 39:3%Q1 to KC1

1KU2
2

= 35:0%Q1,
while KC increases from KC (0) = 68:4%Q1 to KC

1KU2
2

= KU = 72:8%Q1.
5 Marginal value of transmission capacity
The net social surplus is dened as
W
 
+; 

= E [1S (p1 (t) ; t) + 2S (p2 (t) ; t)  c1Q1 (t)  c2Q2 (t)]  r1K1   r2K2
where S (p; t) is the gross consumer surplus at price p, i.e., S (p; t) =
R D(p;t)
0 P (x; t) dx.
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We now determine the social value of an increase in transmission capacity. We consider separately
an increase in + and an increase in  , since actions that may increase the maximum admissible
ow in one direction may not increase the limit in the other direction.
Proposition 2 Marginal value of transmission capacity
1. If +  2KU1 , the interconnection is never congested, hence its marginal value is equal to zero:
@W
@+
= @W
@  = 0.
2. If + < 2KU1 and (
+ + )  1KU2 , the marginal value of interconnection capacity from
market 1 to market 2 is
@W
@+
=
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2) : (11)
The marginal value of interconnection from market 2 to market 1 is equal to zero: @W
@  = 0.
3. If (+ + ) < 1KU2 , the marginal value of interconnection from market 1 to market 2 also
includes the impact of + on XC1 and K
C
1 :
@W
@+
=
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
 
 Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
P
 
XC1 ; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(XC1 ;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
 
 Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
XC1
N
Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Y C1
N
Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt
!
@KC1
@+
:
The marginal value of interconnection from market 2 to market 1 includes the increased cost of
peaking capacity and the impact of   on KC1 :
dW
d 
=
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t
  c2 f (t) dt  r2
 
 Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
XC1
N
Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Y C1
N
Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt
!
@KC1
@ 
:
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix C.
If an interconnection is unconstrained, the marginal value of capacity is equal to zero.
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If the interconnection is congested in one direction only, the marginal value of interconnection
capacity is the value of the substitution between technologies it enables. Equation (11) extends to
the imperfect competition case the optimal transmission capacity derived in the engineering literature
(see for example Schweppe et al. (1988)). It includes imperfect competition (and di¤ers from the
engineering value) in the boundaries of the expectations. The congestion starts in state t^ (X+; c1) and
stops in state t^ (X+; c2), both later than if competition was perfect, since t^0 (X+; cn) < t^ (X+; cn).
Observe that
lim
+!(2KU1 )
 
@W
@+
=  
Z t^(KU1 ;c2)
t^(KU1 ;c1)
Pq
 
KU1 ; t

N
f (t) dt > 0;
i.e., the marginal value of interconnection is discontinuous at + = 2KU1 : strictly positive on the
left, equal to zero on the right. By contrast, the engineering marginal value of interconnection is
continuous (and equal to zero at the boundary). This di¤erence is the strategic e¤ect: an increase in
transmission capacity not only increases the technical e¢ ciency, by allowing substitution of cheaper
for more expensive power, but it also increases competitive intensity.
Numerical simulation using the specication described above shows that @W
@+
 
2K
U
1
 
= 13:08
e=MWh for N = 3. The strategic e¤ect is far from insignicant.
For N = 6, @W
@+
 
2K
U
1
 
= 13:99 e=MWh: transmission is more valuable if the industry is
less concentrated! To understand this surprising result, start from the expression of @W
@+
 
2K
U
1
 
when demand is linear:
@W
@+
 
2K
U
1
 
=
b
N

F
 
t^
 
KU1 ; c2
  F  t^  KU1 ; c1 :
"Di¤erentiating4" with respect to N and denoting t^i = t^
 
KU1 ; ci

yields
@2W
@N@+
 
2K
U
1
 
=
b
N
"
 F
 
t^2
  F  t^1
N
+

f
 
t^2
 @t^2
@N
  f  t^1 @t^1
@N
#
:
The rst term is clearly negative, and corresponds to the "normal" economic intuition: as N increases,
the primary distortion arising from imperfect competition, expressed as bN , decreases. This e¤ect re-
duces the marginal value of transmission capacity. However, a second e¤ect is present: as N increases,
4Technically, di¤erentiation with respect to an integer is not dened, and one should take nite di¤erences. Never-
theless, the analysis provides the intuition.
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t^i is modied. In the illustrative example we use, this second e¤ect is positive, and larger than the
rst.
Finally, as indicated in equation (11), the marginal value from a welfare perspective includes the
full value of the substitution: both the reduction in marginal cost and the increase in investment
cost. This last term is often ignored by practitioners and policy makers. For example, the European
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity Guideline for Cost Benet Analysis of Grid
Development Projects (ENTSO   E, (2013, pp. 31-35) appears to include only the gain in short-
term variable costs, and to ignore the increase in investment costs. In the United States, merchant
transmission lines requested to receive the value of their contribution to generation adequacy in the
importing market, for example by being allowed to participate in capacity markets5. In this case, if
the capacity price was set at r2, the capital cost of the peaking technology, the marginal value of the
line would be estimated as the short-term congestion cost plus r2, thus overstating the true value by
the entire capital cost of the baseload technology r1.
The increase in capital cost is far from insignicant in practice, as illustrated using the previous
example. The marginal value of transmission capacity arising from operating costs is

 
+

=
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt:
Numerical estimation shows that, for N = 3, 
 
2K
U
1
 
= 43:53 e=MWh, slightly lower than the
di¤erence in marginal costs c2   c1 = 45:21e=MWh since the line is not congested all the time. The
true marginal value of transmission capacity is
@W
@+
 
2K
U
1
 
= 
 
2K
U
1
   (r2   r1) = 43:53  30:45 = 13:08 e=MWh:
The marginal value arising from operating costs is 3:3 times larger than true marginal value. This
suggests that, by ignoring that producers take the transmission grid into account when deciding on
generation expansion, policy makers vastly overstate the value of transmission expansion.
Consider now the interconnection congested in both directions. Increasing + has three e¤ects.
5Capacity markets are not included in this analysis. I assume that @W
@+
is not modied when capacity markets are
introduced.
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First, higher interconnection capacity enables the substitution of cheap for expensive power, as in the
previous case. Second, for a given K1, increasing + reduces X1, thus reduces net surplus. Finally,
increasing + increases baseload capacity (less than one for one), which then in turns increases net
surplus.
Similarly, increasing   has three e¤ects: for a given K1, it increases Y1, thus increases net surplus
by (P (Y1; t)  c2). Second, it leads to higher peaking capacity, at capital cost r2. Finally, it leads to
a reduction in KC1 , which reduces net surplus.
6 Marginal impact on interconnection capacity on producers prots
We now examine the marginal impact of increasing transmission capacity on producers prots. Con-
sider rst the case + < 2KU1 and (
+ + )  1KU2 . Di¤erentiating equation (9) yields
dn
d+
=
1
N
 Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t

+X+Pq
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2)
!
=
@B
@X+
 
X+; c1; c2
  r1   r2
N
:
Increasing + modies the FTR revenue: it increases the volume, but it also reduces the price
di¤erential. The oligopolists take this revenue reduction e¤ect into account, which is absent from the
social value. The resulting impact is unclear:
@B
@X+
 
X+; c1; c2

=
1
N
0B@ R t^(X
+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)

P (X+; t) + X
+
N Pq (X
+; t)  c1

f (t) dt+
R +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
+N 1N
R t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
X+Pq (X
+; t) f (t) dt
1CA :
The rst two terms are positive, while the last one is negative.
Furthermore, increasing + lead to a substitution of cheap for dear capacity, at cost
 
r1 r2
N

for
rm n.
IfN = 1, the FTR payment increases, and this e¤ect is high enough to compensate for the increased
investment cost. Formally, for N = 1, d
n
d+
= 	(X+; c1; c2)   (r1   r2), thus dnd+
 
2K
U
1

= 0. Since
	(:; c1; c2) is decreasing in its rst argument, d
n
d+
> 0 for + < 2KU1 .
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This may not be the case for N > 1, at least when the interconnection is lightly congested:
lim
+!(2KU1 )
 
dn
d+
=
N   1
N
Z t^(KU1 ;c2)
t^(KU1 ;c1)
KU1 Pq
 
KU1 ; t

f (t) dt < 0:
Suppose now (+ + ) < 1KU2 . Di¤erentiation of equation (10), presented in Appendix D
yields:
@n
@+
=
@B
@X
 
X+; c1; c2
  @B
@X
 
XC1 ; c1; c2

+
 Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Y C1
N
Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt+
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
XC1
N
Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt
!
N   1
N
@KC1
@+
;
and
@n
@ 
=
@A
@Y C1
 
Y C1 ; c2
  r2
N
+
 Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Y C1
N
Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt+
XC1
N
Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt
!
N   1
N
@KC1
@ 
:
If (+ + ) < 1KU2 , increasing + has a direct impact: the change in the value of the FTR
(term @B@X (X
+; c1; c2)) minus the change in the value of operating prots through the direct impact
of + on XC1 (term
@B
@X
 
XC1 ; c1; c2

). This direct impact cannot be signed in general. Increasing +
also has an indirect impact: the change in competitors baseload investment (term N 1N
@KC1
@+
) times
its impact on own prot (term
R +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Y C1
N Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt+
R t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
XC1
N Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt). Since
an increase in + increases KC1 , and an increase in competitors capacity reduces prots in Cournot
games, the indirect impact is negative.
Similarly, increasing   has a direct impact, including increased investment cost, and an indirect
impact. Since increasing   reduces competitorsbaseload investment, the indirect impact is positive.
These observations are summarized in the following:
Proposition 3 A marginal increase in interconnection capacity has an ambiguous impact on produc-
ers prots. It modies the FTR payment, but also the investment prole.
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7 Conclusion
This article is the rst to examine investment decisions for electric power generation under imperfect
competition and in the presence of transmission constraints. This analysis yields four original insights
relevant for policy makers. First, it shows that congestion is dynamic and potentially transient, for
example, congestion may disappear when demand is the highest. Second, it nds that transmission
constraints modify generation investment in a non-trivial way: an increase in transmission capacity
may increase, decrease, or have no impact on the marginal value of generation capacity. It may have
similar or opposite impacts on the marginal value of baseload (low marginal cost) and peaking (high
marginal cost) technologies. These two observations suggest that, to evaluate the impact of their
policies, decision makers must develop detailed models of the industry, that include the transmission
network. Third, the social value of transmission is not solely the di¤erence in marginal costs, as is
commonly assumed, but also includes the impact of transmission on investment in generation and
on competitive intensity. The resulting value may be signicantly lower than the simple di¤erence
in marginal costs. Finally, the impact of an increase in interconnection capacity on producersprof-
its is unclear, which strengthens the policy objective of vertical separation between producers and
transmission grid owners.
The analysis presented here can be expanded in several directions. One can examine di¤erent
transmission pricing rules, di¤erent ownership structures, and more general network topologies and
technology mixes. It would be interesting to see how the results would change. For example, one
would like to establish su¢ cient conditions for the Cournot investment to be obtained from the optimal
investment by replacing demand by marginal revenues.
In addition, the analysis presented here can be used to examine various policy issues involving two
interconnected markets. For example, one can determine the impact of introducing a capacity market
in one market, while the other one remains energy-only.
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A Equilibrium investment when + < 2KU1 and (
+ +  )  1KU2
A.1 Expected prots for a symmetric strategy
For t 2 0; t^ (X+; c1), only baseload technology is producing and serving the entire market. Firms
play a N -player Cournot game with marginal cost c1, hence the aggregate production in state t is
QC (c1; t). Since + < 2KU1 , the transmission line becomes congested before baseload generation
produces at capacity:
2Q
C (c1; t) = 
+ , QC (c1; t) = X+ , t = t^
 
X+; c1

:
For t  t^ (X+; c1), as long as the interconnection is congested, both markets are independent. We
rst examine market 2. As long as the peaking technology is not turned on, price in market 2 is
determined by the intersection of the vertical supply curve at +, and the demand curves 2D (p; t),
thus p2 (t) = P (X+; t).
From equation (4), technology 2 is turned on as soon as
@n
@qn2

qn2 (t)=0
= 0, @
n
@n2

n2 (t)=
X+
N
= P
 
X+; t
  c2 + X+
N
Pq
 
X+; t

= 0, t = t^  X+; c2 :
As expected, the decision to turn-on the peaking technology is independent of the conditions in market
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1. Thus, for t 2 t^ (X+; c1) ; t^ (X+; c2), p2 (t) = P (X+; t).
For t 2 t^ (X+; c2) ; t^ (X1; c2), the peaking technology produces  2 = QC (c2; t).
To understand the upper bound t^ (X1; c2), we now turn to market 1. For t  t^ (X+; c1), producers
in market 1 compete à la Cournot, thus n1 =
QC(c1;t)
N . This lasts until the baseload technology reaches
capacity:
QC (c1; t) = X1 , t = t^ (X1; c1) :
For t  t^ (X1; c1), price in market 1 is determined by the intersection of the vertical supply curve
(K1   +) and the demand curves 1D (p; t), thus p1 (t) = P (X1; t).
p1 (t) increases until it reaches the price is market 2, p2 (t) = P
 
QC (c2; t) ; t

:
X1 = Q
C (c2; t), t = t^ (X1; c2) :
This characterization of equilibria assumes that the price in the baseload market reaches c2 before
the peaking technology reaches capacity, i.e., that t^ (X1; c2)  t^ (X2; c2). This is proven below:
Lemma 2 Assumption 2 implies that t^ (X1; c2)  t^ (X2; c2).
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose t^ (X2; c2) < t^ (X1; c2): peaking technology reaches
capacity before price in market 1 reaches c2. Then, the line is always congested and
X2 =  (c2; r2) and X1 =  (c1; r1) :
Thus,
t^ (X2; c2) < t^ (X1; c2), X2 < X1 ,  (c2; r2) <  (c1; r1)
which is contrary to assumption 2. Thus, t^ (X2; c2) < t^ (X1; c2) leads to a contradiction, which proves
the lemma.
For t  t^ (X1; c2), the interconnection is no longer constrained, and we are back to the uncon-
strained case.
To simplify the expressions, it is useful to introduce the expected Cournot prots over an interval
IC (c; a; b) =
Z b
a
QC (c; t)
N
 
P
 
QC (c; t) ; t
  c f (t) dt and IC (c; a) = Z +1
a
QC (c; t)
N
 
P
 
QC (c; t) ; t
  c f (t) dt:
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Using this notation, it is sometimes more convenient to express B (z; Z; c1; c2) as
B (z; Z; c1; c2) =
Z t^(z;Z;c2)
t^(z;Z;c1)
z (P (Z; t)  c1) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(z;Z;c2)
z (c2   c1) f (t) dt+IC (c1; 0)+IC
 
c2; t^ (z; Z; c2)

:
Expected prots can be expressed as
n = IC
 
c1; 0; t^
 
X+; c1

+1
 
IC
 
c1; t^
 
X+; c1

; t^ (X1; c1)

+
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(X1;c1)
xn1 (P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt
!
+2
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
X+
N
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+2
 
IC
 
c2; t^
 
X+; c2

; t^ (X1; c2)

+
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(X+;c2)
X+
N
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
+IC
 
c2; t^ (X1; c2) ; t^ (K; c2)

+
Z t^(K;c2)
t^(X1;c2)
kn1 (c2   c1) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(K;c2)
(kn (P (K; t)  c2) + kn1 (c2   c1)) f (t) dt  (r1   r2) kn1   r2kn:
Observing that kn1 = 1x
n
1 +
+, then rearranging terms yields
n = 1x
n
1
 Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(X1;c1)
xn1 (P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1)  (r1   r2)
!
+
Z +1
t^(K;c2)
kn (P (K; t)  c2) f (t) dt  r2kn
+2
X+
N
 Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2)
!
+IC
 
c1; 0; t^
 
X+; c1

+ 1I
C
 
c1; t^
 
X+; c1

; t^ (X1; c1)

+2I
C
 
c2; t^
 
X+; c2

; t^ (X1; c2)

+ IC
 
c2; t^ (X1; c2) ; t^ (K; c2)

:
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Introducing the necessary integrals IC yields
n = 1
 Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(X1;c1)
xn1 (P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt  IC
 
c1; t^ (X1; c1) ; t^ (X1; c2)
!
+1
 Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1)xn1   (r1   r2)xn1
!
+
Z +1
t^(K;c2)
kn (P (K; t)  c2) f (t) dtf (t) dt  IC
 
c2; t^ (K; c2)
  r2kn
+2
 Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
X+
N
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt  IC  c1; t^  X+; c1 ; t^  X+; c2  (r1   r2) X+
N
!
+IC (c1; 0) ;
thus
n = 1 (B (x
n
1 ; X1; c1; c2)  (r1   r2)xn1 )+(A (kn;K; c2)  r2kn)+2

B
 
X+; c1; c2
  (r1   r2) 1
N
X+

;
which is equation (9).
A.2 Proof of equilibrium, peaking technology
Since the interconnection is no longer saturated when the peaking technology reaches capacity, the
proof of the unconstrained case (Zöttl (2011)) applies.
A.3 Proof of equilibrium baseload technology, downward deviation
Consider a downward deviation by producer 1: for all n  1, kC = KCN , for all n > 1, xC1 =
KC1  +
N =
KU1
N , while x
1
1  xC1 .
As we consider downward (and later upward) deviations, we introduce two additional functions.
The symmetric equilibrium strategy for (N   1) rms competing à la Cournot for marginal cost c in
state t, while the last rm produces y is N 1 (y; c; t), uniquely dened by
P
 
y + (N   1) N 1; t+ N 1Pq  y + (N   1) N 1; t = c:
Similarly, the monopoly output for a rm with marginal cost c in state t, while the (N   1) other
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rms each produces y is M (y; c; t) uniquely dened by
P
 
(N   1) y + M ; t+ MPq  (N   1) y + M ; t = c:
A.3.1 Small downward deviation
Consider rst small downward deviations, such that the interconnection is congested before the base-
load technology produces at capacity, as illustrated on Figure 9:
X+  X1 , X+  K1:
As previously, for t  t^ (X+; c1), rms compete à la Cournot for marginal cost c1. Each produces
QC(c1;t)
N .
Consider now t  t^ (X+; c1). Consider rst market 1. For t  t^ (X+; c1), rms play a symmetric
equilibrium n1 =
QC(c1;t)
N . This lasts until
n1 =
QC (c1; t)
N
= x11 = t = t^
 
x11; Nx
1
1; c1

:
For t  t^  x11; Nx11; c1, rm 1s adjusted production is x11. Adjusted production for the (N   1)
larger rms is n1 = 
N 1  x11; c1; t. Then, these rms produce at their baseload capacity when
n1 (t) = x
C
1 , P
 
x11 + (N   1)xC1 ; t

+ xC1 P
 
x11 + (N   1)xC1 ; t

= c1 , t = t^
 
xC1 ; X1; c1

:
For t 2 t^  xC1 ; X1; c1 ; t^ (X1; c2), all rms produce at baseload capacity. To understand the upper
bound t^ (X1; c2), we now turn to market 2.
For t 2 t^ (X+; c1) ; t^ (X+; c2), peaking technology is not yet turned on.
For t  t^ (X+; c2), all rms turn on peaking technology and play the symmetric equilibrium
n2 =
QC(c2;t)
N . Then, prices in both markets are equal when
P (X1; t) = P
 
QC (c2; t) ; t
, X1 = QC (c2; t), t = t^ (X1; c2) :
For t  t^ (X1; c2), nothing changes compared to the symmetric equilibrium.
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This yields expected prot
1 = IC
 
c1; 0; t^
 
X+; c1

+1I
C
 
c1; t^
 
X+; c1

; t^
 
x11; Nx
1
1; c1

+1
Z t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
t^(x11;Nx11;c1)
x11
 
P
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+1
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
x11 (P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt
+2
X+
N
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+2
 
IC
 
c2; t^
 
X+; c2

; t^ (X1; c2)

+
X+
N
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
+IC
 
c2; t^ (X1; c2) ; t^
 
KU ; c2

+
Z t^(KU ;c2)
t^(X1;c2)
k11 (c2   c1) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(KU ;c2)
 
kU
 
P
 
KU ; t
  c2+ k11 (c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2) k11   r2kU :
Since output is continuous with respect to t, all functions are also continuous with respect to t. Thus,
only the derivative of the integrands matters. Then,
@1
@k11
=
Z t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
t^(x11;Nx11;c1)

P
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1; t

+ x11

1 + (N   1) @
N 1
@x11

Pq   c1

f (t) dt
+
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2) :
The rst-order condition dening N 1 is
P
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1; t

+ N 1Pq
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1; t

= c1;
thus
P + x11

1 + (N   1) @
N 1
@x11

Pq   c1 =  

N 1   x11   (N   1)
@N 1
@x11

Pq  0
since N 1  x11, @
N 1
@x11
< 0 since quantities are substitutes, and Pq < 0. Thus, the rst integral is
positive.
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Substituting the rst-order condition (8) dening xC1 in the last three terms yields
E1 =
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2)
=
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt 
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

+ xC1 Pq
 
XC1 ; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
=
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt 
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(X1;c2)
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

+ xC1 Pq
 
XC1 ; t
  c2 f (t) dt
+
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t) 
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

+ xC1 Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt:
Since xC1  x11, t^
 
xC1 ; X1; c1
  t^  x11; X1; c1, thus the rst integral is positive. The second integral
is negative since t  t^  XC1 ; c2. Finally, the last integral is positive since xC1  x11 and the marginal
revenue is decreasing. Thus E1 > 0, hence @@k11
> 0: no downward deviation is protable.
A.3.2 Large downward deviation
Suppose now the downward deviation is so large that rm 1 reaches baseload capacity before the line
is constrained, t^
 
k11; Nk
1
1; c1

< t^ (X+; c1).
If the (N   1) other rms reach baseload capacity before the line is constrained, the line is never
constrained. Thus, applying the analysis of the unconstrained case, no downward deviation is prof-
itable.
Suppose now the line is constrained before the peaking technology is turned-on (and before the
(N   1) other rms produce at baseload capacity). The structure of the prot function is illustrated
on Figure 10. For t 2 t^  k11; Nk11; c1 ; t^ (X+; c1), rm 1 produces at its capacity k11, while the
(N   1) other rms play a symmetric Cournot equilibrium N 1  k11; c1; t. For t  t^ (X+; c1), the
interconnection is constrained, and we are back to the previous case. To simplify the exposition, I
present only the relevant terms, i.e., terms that include x11 (or k
1
1) in the integrand. D2, the sum of
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the relevant terms is
D2 =
Z t^(X+;c1)
t^(k11 ;Nk11 ;c1)
k11
 
P
 
k11 + (N   1) N 1
 
k11; c1; t

; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+1x
1
1
Z t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1
 
x11; c1; t

; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+1x
1
1
 Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
(P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2)
!
:
Then,
@1
@k11
=
Z t^(X+;c1)
t^(x11;Nx11;c1)

P
 
k11 + (N   1) N 1; t

+ k11

1 + (N   1) @
N 1
@k11

Pq   c1

f (t) dt
+
Z t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
t^(X+;c1)

P
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1; t

+ x11

1 + (N   1) @
N 1
@x11

Pq   c1

f (t) dt
+1
 Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2)
!
:
As for small downward deviations, inserting the rst-order conditions dening N 1
 
k11; c1; t

, N 1
 
x11; c1; t

,
and XC1 , then re-arranging proves that
@
@k11
> 0: no downward deviation is protable.
Suppose now the downward deviation is so large that the interconnection is constrained after
rm 1 turns on the peaking technology (but still before the (N   1) other rms produce at baseload
capacity). For t  t^  k11; Nk11; c1, the (N   1) larger rms produce N 1  k11; c1; t. Firm 1 turns on
the peaking technology for t
 
k11; c1; c2

dened by
P
 
k11 + (N   1) N 1
 
k11; c1; t
 ; t+ k11Pq  k11 + (N   1) N 1  k11; c1; t ; t = c2:
For t  t  k11; c1; c2 rms play an asymmetric Cournot equilibrium, rm 1 with marginal cost c2,
the (N   1) rms with marginal cost c1. Denote C (c2; c1; t) rms 1 strategy, and N 1 (c1; c2; t) the
strategy of the (N   1) other rms. Observe that neither C (c2; c1; t) nor N 1 (c1; c2; t) depend on
k11. The ow on the interconnection is
' (t) = 2Q1 (t)  1Q2 (t) = 2
 
k11 + (N   1) N 1 (c1; c2; t)
  1  C (c2; c1; t)  k11
= k11 + 2 (N   1) N 1 (c1; c2; t)  1C (c2; c1; t) :
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Depending on the values of 1 and 2, ' (t) may be increasing or decreasing. If ' (t) is decreasing or
if ' (t) is increasing and
k11 + 2 (N   1) kC1   1C (c2; c1; t)  +;
the line is never congested, and we are back to the uncongested case. If ' (t) is increasing, the line
may be congested for t (X+; c1; c2) uniquely dened by
k11 + 2 (N   1) N 1 (c1; c2; t)  1C (c2; c1; t) = +:
This situation is described on Figure 11. D3, the sum of the relevant terms, is
D3 =
Z t(k11 ;c1c2)
t^(k11 ;Nk11 ;c1)
k11
 
P
 
k11 + (N   1) N 1
 
k11; c1; t

; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+1x
1
1
Z t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
t(X+;c1;c2)
 
P
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1
 
x11; c1; t

; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+1x
1
1
 Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
(P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2)
!
:
Analysis similar to the previous cases shows that @
1
@k11
> 0 for k11 < k
C
1 : no negative deviation is
protable.
A.4 Proof of equilibrium, baseload technology upward deviation
Consider an upward deviation by rm 1: for all n  1, kC = KCN , for all n > 1, kC1 =
KC1
N , while
k11  kC1 . x11 and X1 are dened as previously.
For t  t^ (X+; c1), rms in market 1 play a symmetric equilibrium n1 = Q
C
1 (c1;t)
N , up until the
(N   1) smallest rms reach their baseload capacity:
QC1 (c1; t)
N
= xC1 , t = t^
 
xC1 ; Nx
C
1 ; c1

:
For t  t^  xC1 ; NxC1 ; c1, rm 1 is a monopolist on residual demand, hence 11 (t) = M  xC1 ; c1; t
up until
M
 
xC1 ; c1; t

= x11 , t = t^
 
x11; X1; c1

:
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For t 2 t^  x11; X1; c1 ; t^ (X1; c2), all rms produce at baseload capacity, while the interconnection
remains congested.
For t  t^ (X1; c2), the interconnection is no longer congested. This situation is represented on
Figure 12.
The relevant terms in the prot function are thus
U1 = 1x
1
1
 Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(x11;X1;c1)
(P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2)
!
:
Then,
@1
@k11
=
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(x11;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2) ;
and
1
@21 
@x11
2 = Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(x11;X1;c1)
 
2Pq (X1; t) + x
1
1Pqq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt < 0 :
an upward deviation is never protable.
Paradoxically, including the constraint on the interconnection simplies the analysis of upwards
deviations. The decision to turn on the peaking technology in market 2 is independent of the conditions
in market 1, hence the second-order derivative has a very simple expression.
B Equilibrium investment when (+ +  ) < 1KU2
B.1 Expected prots for a symmetric strategy
Nothing changes for t  t^ (X1; c2). For t 2

t^ (X1; c2) ; t^ (Y1; c2)

, all rms play a symmetric Cournot
equilibrium for marginal cost c2, thus each produces
QC(c2;t)
N . The transmission constraint from market
2 to market 1 becomes binding when
K1   1QC (c2; t) =    , QC (c2; t) = K1 +
 
1
= Y1 , t = t^ (Y1; c2) :
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For t  t^ (Y1; c2), the markets split again. Firms n prots are
n = qn1 (p1   c1) qn1 + qn (p2   c2) +
 
N
(p1   p2)
= qn1

P

Q1 +
 
1
; t

  c1

+ qn2

P

Q2    
2
; t

  c2

+
 
N
(p1   p2)
= 1
qn1 +
 
N
1

P

Q1 +
 
1
; t

  c1

+ 2
qn2   
 
N
2

P

Q2    
2
; t

  c2

  
 
N
(c2   c1)
= 1
n
1 (P (1; t)  c1) + 2n2 (P (2; t)  c2) 
 
N
(c2   c1) ;
where n1 =
qn1+
 
N
1
, n2 =
qn2 
 
N
2
, and i =
PN
n=1 
n
i for i = 1; 2.
For t  t^ (Y1; c2), rms in market 1 produce at baseload capacity, while rms in market 2 compete
à la Cournot, for marginal cost c2, thus n2 =
QC(c2;t)
N . This lasts until
n2 = y
n
2 , Y2 = QC (c2; t), t = t^ (Y2; c2) :
Finally, for t  t^ (Y2; c2), rms in market 2 produce at capacity.
This yields expected prots
n = IC
 
c1; 0; t^
 
X+; c1

+1
 
IC
 
c1; t^
 
X+; c1

; t^ (X1; c1)

+
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(X1;c1)
xn1 (P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt
!
+2
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
X+
N
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+2
 
IC
 
c2; t^
 
X+; c2

; t^ (X1; c2)

+
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(X+;c2)
X+
N
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
+IC
 
c2; t^ (X1; c2) ; t^ (Y1; c2)

+
Z t^(Y1;c2)
t^(X1;c2)
kn1 (c2   c1) f (t) dt
+1
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
yn1 (P (Y1; t)  c1) f (t) dt 
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
 
N
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
+2
 
IC
 
c2; t^ (Y1; c2) ; t^ (Y2; c2)

+
Z +1
t^(Y2;c2)
yn2 (P (Y2; t)  c2) f (t) dtn2
!
  r1kn1   r2kn2 :
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Observe that
1
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
yn1 (P (Y1; t)  c1) f (t) dt = 1
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
yn1 (P (Y1; t)  c2) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
1y
n
1 (c2   c1) f (t) dt
= 1
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
yn1 (P (Y1; t)  c2) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
1x
n
1 (c2   c1) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
+ + 
N
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
since
kn1 = 1x
n
1 +
+
N
= 1y
n
1  
 
N
) 1yn1 = 1xn1 +
+ + 
N
:
Then, rearranging terms yields
n = 1
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
yn1 (P (Y1; t)  c2) f (t) dt
+1
 Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(X1;c1)
xn1 (P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
xn1 (c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
  r1kn1
+2
 Z +1
t^(Y2;c2)
yn2 (P (Y2; t)  c2) f (t) dtn2   r2yn2
!
+2
X+
N
 Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
  r2
 
N
+IC
 
c1; 0; t^
 
X+; c1

+ 1I
C
 
c1; t^
 
X+; c1

; t^ (X1; c1)

+2I
C
 
c2; t^
 
X+; c2

; t^ (X1; c2)

+ IC
 
c2; t^ (X1; c2) ; t^ (Y1; c2)

+2I
C
 
c2; t^ (Y1; c2) ; t^ (Y2; c2)

;
thus
n = 1 (A (y
n
1 ; Y1; c2) +B (x
n
1 ; X1; c1; c2)) r1kn1+2 (A (yn2 ; Y2; c2)  r2yn2 )+2B
 
X+; c1; c2
 r2 
N
;
which is equation (10).
B.2 Proof of equilibrium, peaking technology
The peaking capacity has no impact on the transmission constraints, which are solely determined by
the baseload capacity. The unconstrained analysis thus applies, and yn2 =
KU
N is an equilibrium.
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B.3 Proof of equilibrium, baseload technology
Consider a small downward deviation by rm 1. For t  t^ (X+; c1), n1 = Q
C(c1;t)
N . Firm 1 reaches
baseload capacity when
x11 =
QC (c1; t)
N
, t = t^  x11; Nx11; c1 :
For t  t^  x11; Nx11; c1, rm 1 produces at its baseload capacity, and the other rms produce
n1 = 
N 1  x11; c1; t. The (N   1) other rms reach baseload capacity when
xC1 = 
N 1  x11; c1; t, t = t^  xC1 ; X1; c1 :
When the interconnection was constrained in one direction only xC1 = k
U
1 . This is no longer the case
when the interconnection is constrained in both directions.
For t 2 t^  xC1 ; X1; c1 ; t^ (X1; c2), all rms produce at their baseload capacity.
For t 2 t^ (X1; c2) ; t^ (Y1; c2), the interconnection is not congested, and qn = QC(c2;t)N .
For t  t^ (Y1; c2), the interconnection is congested from market 2 to market 1. This is illustrated
on Figure 13.
The relevant terms in the prot function are
D4 = 1x
1
1
Z t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
t^(x11;Nx11;c1)
 
P
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1; t
  c1 f (t) dt
+1x
1
1
 Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
(P (X1; t)  c1) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
+
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
2y
1
1 (P (Y1; t)  c2) f (t) dt  r1k11
Then
@1
@k11
=
Z t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
t^(x11;Nx11;c1)

P
 
x11 + (N   1) N 1; t

+ x11Pq 

1 + (N   1) @
N 1
@x11
; t

  c1

f (t) dt
+
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
 
P (Y1; t) + y
1
1Pq (Y1; t)  c2

f (t) dt  r1:
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The familiar argument shows that the rm term is positive since x11  N 1. Inserting the rst-order
condition (8) yields two terms. The rst term is
E4 =
Z +1
t^(Y1;c2)
 
P (Y1; t) + y
1
1Pq (Y1; t)  c2

f (t) dt 
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
yC1
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t

+ yC1 Pq
 
Y C1 ; t
  c2 f (t) dt
=
Z t^(Y C1 ;c2)
t^(Y1;c2)
y11
 
P (Y1; t) + y
1
1Pq (Y1; t)  c2

f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
P (Y1; t) + y
1
1Pq (Y1; t) 
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t

+ yC1 Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt;
which is positive since t^ (Y1; c2)  t^
 
y11; Y1; c2

, and y11  yC1 and the marginal revenue is decreasing.
The second term is
F4 =
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt 
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

+ xC1 Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt
+
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(X1;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
=
Z t^(XC1 ;c1)
t^(xC1 ;X1;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t)  c1

f (t) dt
+
Z t^(X1;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
P (X1; t) + x
1
1Pq (X1; t) 
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

+ xC1 Pq (X1; t)

f (t) dt
 
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(X1;c2)
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

+ xC1 Pq (X1; t)  c2

f (t) dt;
which is positive since x11  xC1 , thus t^
 
x11; X1; c1
  t^  xC1 ; X1; c1; the marginal revenue is decreasing;
and P
 
XC1 ; t

+xC1 Pq (X1; t) c2 < 0 for t  t^
 
XC1 ; c2

. Thus, @
1
@k11
is positive: no downward deviation
is protable.
A similar argument can be applied to a larger downward deviation, and to upward deviations.
B.4 Proof of Corollary 1: properties of KC1 (
+; )
First observe that 	(:; :) is decreasing in both arguments by inspection, and that, for c1 < c2,
(	 (:; c1) 	(:; c2)) is decreasing since
	q (Z; c1) 	q (Z; c2) = (N + 1)
N
Z t^(Z;c2)
t^(Z;c1)

Pq (Z; t) +
Z
N + 1
Pqq (Z; t)

f (t) dt < 0.
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Implicit di¤erentiation of equation (8) with respect to + yields
	q
 
XC1 ; c1
@KC1
@+
  1

 	q
 
XC1 ; c2
@KC1
@+
  1

+	q
 
Y C1 ; c2
 @KC1
@+
= 0
,
@KC1
@+
=
	q
 
XC1 ; c1
 	q  XC1 ; c2
	q
 
XC1 ; c1
 	q  XC1 ; c2+	q  Y C1 ; c2 > 0:
Then, implicit di¤erentiation of equation (8) with respect to   yields
	q
 
XC1 ; c1
 @KC1
@ 
 	q
 
XC1 ; c2
 @KC1
@ 
+	q
 
Y C1 ; c2
@KC1
@ 
+ 1

= 0
,
@KC1
@ 
=   	q
 
Y C1 ; c2

	q
 
XC1 ; c1
 	q  XC1 ; c2+	q  Y C1 ; c2 = @K
C
1
@+
  1:
Finally, for + =   = 0, equation (8) simplies to
	

KC1
1
; c1

 	

KC1
1
; c2

+	

KC1
1
; c2

= r1 , 	

KC1
1
; c1

= r1 , KC1 (0; 0) = 1 (c1; r1) :
Setting   = 0 in equation (7) shows that KC2 (0; 0) = 2 (c2; r2).
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C Proof of Proposition 2: marginal value of interconnection capac-
ity
For + < 2KU1 and (
+ + )  1KU2 , substituting in the optimal values yields
W
 
+

=
Z t^(X+;c1)
0
 
S
 
P
 
QC (c1; t) ; t

; t
  c1QC (c1; t) f (t) dt
+
Z t^(KU1 ;c1)
t^(X+;c1)
 
1S
 
P
 
QC (c1; t) ; t

; t
  c1  1QC1 (t) + + f (t) dt
+
Z t^(KU1 ;c2)
t^(KU1 ;c1)
 
1S
 
P
 
KU1 ; t

; t
  c1  1KU1 ++ f (t) dt
+
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
2S
 
P
 
X+; t

; t

f (t) dt
+
Z t^(KU1 ;c2)
t^(X+;c2)
 
2S
 
P
 
QC (c2; t) ; t

; t
  c2  2QC2 (t)  + f (t) dt
+
Z t^(KU ;c2)
t^(KU1 ;c2)
 
S
 
P
 
QC (c2; t) ; t

; t
  c2QC (c2; t) + (c2   c1)  1KU1 ++ f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(KU ;c2)
 
S
 
P
 
KU ; t

; t
  c2KU + (c2   c1)  1KU1 ++ f (t) dt
 r2KU   (r1   r2)
 
1K
U
1 +
+

:
Introducing the expected Cournot surplus
JC (c; a; b) =
Z b
a
 
S
 
P
 
QC (c; t) ; t

; t
  cQC (c; t) f (t) dt;
and rearranging yields
W
 
+

= 1
Z t^(KU1 ;c2)
t^(KU1 ;c1)
 
S
 
P
 
KU1 ; t

; t
  c1KU1  f (t) dt  (r1   r2)KU1
+
Z +1
t^(KU ;c2)
 
S
 
P
 
KU ; t

; t
  c2KU f (t) dt  r2KU
+2
 Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
S
 
P
 
X+; t

; t
  c1X+ f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
X+ (c2   c1) f (t) dt  (r1   r2)X+
!
+JC
 
c1; 0; t^
 
X+; c1

+ 1J
C
 
c1; t^
 
X+; c1

; t^
 
KU1 ; c1

+2J
C
 
c2; t^
 
X+; c2

; t^
 
KU1 ; c2

+ JC
 
c2; t^
 
KU1 ; c2

; t^
 
KU ; c2

:
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Since output hence surplus are continuous with respect to the state of the world, only the derivatives
of the integrands matter. Thus,
dW
d+
=
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1)  (r1   r2) :
We immediately verify that
d2W
(d+)2
=
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
Pq
 
X+; t

f (t) dt+
X+
N
P
 
X+; t^
 
X+; c1
 @t^ (X+; c1)
@X+
f
 
t^
 
X+; c1

< 0:
For (+ + ) < 1KU2 ;
W
 
+; 

= JC
 
c1; 0; t^
 
X+; c1

+1J
C
 
c1; t^
 
X+; c1

; t^
 
XC1 ; c1

+1
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
S
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

; t
  c1XC1  f (t) dt
+2
 Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
S
 
P
 
X+; t

; t

f (t) dt+
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(X+;c2)
X+ (c2   c1)
!
f (t) dt
+2J
C
 
c2; t^
 
X+; c2

; t^
 
XC1 ; c2

+JC
 
c2; t^
 
XC1 ; c2

; t^
 
Y C1 ; c2

+
Z t^(Y C1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c2)
(c2   c1)
 
1X
C
1 +
+

f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
1S
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t

; t
  c1KC1  f (t) dt
+
Z t^(Y C2 ;c2)
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
2S
 
P
 
QC (c2; t) ; t

; t
  c2  2QC (c2; t) +   f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(KU ;c2)
 
2S
 
P
 
KU ; t

; t
  c2  2KU +  f (t) dt
 r2
 
2K
U + 
  r1KC1 :
46
Observing that
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
1S
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t

; t
  c1KC1  f (t) dt = Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
1S
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t

; t
  c2  1Y C1     f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
(c2   c1)
 
1X
C
1 +
+

f (t) dt
= 1
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
S
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t

; t
  c2Y C1  f (t) dt
+1
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
XC1 (c2   c1) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
c2
 f (t) dt+ 2
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
X+ (c2   c1) f (t) dt;
then rearranging yields
W
 
+; 

= 1
 Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(X1;c1)
 
S
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

; t
  c1XC1  f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(XC1 ;c2)
XC1 (c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
+1
 Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
S
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t

; t
  c2Y C1  f (t) dt
!
  r1KC1
+2
 Z +1
t^(KU ;c2)
 
S
 
P
 
KU ; t

; t
  c2KU f (t) dt  r2KU!
+2
 Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
S
 
P
 
X+; t

; t
  c1X+ f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
X+ (c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
 r2 
+2J
C
 
c1; 0; t^
 
X+; c1

+ 1J
C
 
c1; 0; t^
 
XC1 ; c1

+2J
C
 
c2; t^
 
X+; c2

; t^
 
Y C2 ; c2

+ 1J
C
 
c2; t^
 
XC1 ; c2

; t^
 
Y C1 ; c2

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Thus,
dW
d+
=
@W
@+
+
@W
@KC1
@KC1
@+
=  
 Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

; t  c1

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(XC1 ;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
+
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
+
0B@
R t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
P
 
XC1 ; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ R +1t^(XC1 ;c2) (c2   c1) f (t) dt  r1
+
R +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t
  c2Y C1  f (t) dt
1CA @KC1
@+
=
Z t^(X+;c2)
t^(X+;c1)
 
P
 
X+; t
  c1 f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^(X+;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
 
 Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
 
P
 
XC1 ; t

; t  c1

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(XC1 ;c2)
(c2   c1) f (t) dt
!
  1
N
 Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt
!
@KC1
@+
which proves the result. Finally,
dW
d 
=
@W
@ 
+
@W
@KC1
@KC1
@ 
=
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
 
P
 
Y C1 ; t
  c2Y C1  f (t) dt  r2
  1
N
 Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt
!
@KC1
@+
D Proof of Proposition 3
Di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect to + yields
@n
@+
=
@B
@X
 
X+; c1; c2
  @B
@X
 
XC1 ; c1; c2

+

@A
@Y
 
Y C1 ; c2

+
@B
@X
 
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  r1
N

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Observing that
@A
@Y
(Y; c) =
1
N
Z +1
t^(Y;c)
(P (Y; t) + Y Pq (Y; t)  c) f (t) dt
=
1
N
 
	(Y; c) + (N   1)
Z +1
t^(Y;c)
Y
N
Pq (Y; t) f (t) dt
!
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@n
@+
=
@B
@X
 
X+; c1; c2
  @B
@X
 
XC1 ; c1; c2

+
1
N
 
	
 
Y C1 ; c2

+	
 
XC1 ; c1
 	  XC1 ; c2  r1+ @KC1@+
+
N   1
N
 Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Y C1
N
Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt+
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
XC1
N
Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt
!
@KC1
@+
;
which then yields the result.
Similarly, di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect to   yields
@n
@ 
=
@A
@Y
 
Y C1 ; c2
  r2
N
+

@A
@Y
 
Y C1 ; c2

+
@B
@X
 
XC1 ; c1; c2
  r1
N

@KC1
@ 
=
@A
@Y
 
Y C1 ; c2
  r2
N
+
N   1
N
 Z +1
t^(Y C1 ;c2)
Y C1
N
Pq
 
Y C1 ; t

f (t) dt+
Z t^(XC1 ;c2)
t^(XC1 ;c1)
XC1
N
Pq
 
XC1 ; t

f (t) dt
!
@KC1
@ 
;
which yields the result.
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Figure 1: Unconstrained Cournot equilibrium
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Figure 2: Unconstrained prices and quantities
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Figure 4: congestion regimes if
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Figure 5a: Sequence of Cournot equilibria, market 1
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Figure 5b: Sequence of Cournot equilibria, market 2
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Figure 5c: Sequence of Cournot equilibria, 
congestion has stopped
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Figure 6a: sequence of Cournot equilibria, market 1
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Figure 6b: sequence of Cournot equilibria, market 2
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Figure 7: Britain to France interconnection flows 
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Imports from France into Britain (+), exports from Britain into France (-), 
year 2010, hours ordered from highest to lowest imports, MW
Source:National Grid
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Figure 8: Equilibrium capacities
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Figure 9: small downward deviation
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Figure 10: large downward deviation
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Figure 11: very large downward deviation
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Figure 12: upward deviation
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Figure 13: small downward deviation – 2 way 
congestion
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